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The website of the Turkish Foreigner’s Department, revamped in line with the EU 
accession criteria of accessibility and transparency, hosts a separate page devoted 
to the topic of ‘illegal migration’. The page opens with the declaration that ‘it is a 
basic instinct of human beings to reside in the country in which they are born, the 
country to which they belong and the country to which they are tied with the tie of 
citizenship’. Implicating that all movement beyond borders is something aberrant, 
and privileging rootedness as something natural, the state discourse on migration 
goes on to define illegal migration as ‘leaving the country where one legally resides 
and entering another country through illegal means, or, after legal entry, not exiting 
within the legally defined time period and living/working in that country without 
legal permission’.1
Malkki’s (1992, 1995) prescient work on essentialist constructions of refugees 
has addressed the ways in which national identity is a deeply territorialized concept 
that renders suspect those whose ties to a singular national soil are regarded as 
tenuous. Since then, a growing body of critical scholarship has exposed the as-
sumptions and contradictions that underlie the designation of migrants as ‘legal’ 
or ‘illegal’. Some of these works emphasize the fluidity of the line that allegedly 
separates legality from illegality when one takes seriously the ways in which exist-
ing laws translate into everyday practice (Coutin 2005) and embodied experience 
(Willen 2007); others point to the ways in which migration policies often result in, 
and even actively produce, illegality (Calavita 1998; De Genova 2005); yet others 
focus on the ways in which the state rhetoric of fighting illegality masks a tacit 
tolerance of illegality (Balibar 2004; Favell 2008; Sassen 1996). Activists have also 
systematically taken to task the terminology that brands people as ‘illegal’: from 
the insistence on the term sans papiers in France to ‘Kein Mensch ist Illegal/no 
1 www.egm.gov.tr/hizmet.yabancilar.goc.asp, last accessed 28 July 2011.
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one is illegal’ networks around the world, oppositional groups have rallied to raise 
awareness of the fact that the term ‘illegal immigrant’ makes sense only when one 
takes for granted the standpoint of the nation state with its a priori denial of the 
principle of the equal right of presence for all.
This chapter seeks to demonstrate yet another instance of the indistinct line be-
tween what gets designated as legality and illegality, honing in on the Turkish con-
text through ethnographic analysis of the everyday practices of Turkish-speaking 
migrants from Bulgaria. The more novel aspect of this contribution to the extant 
literature lies in the fact that the ethnographic material presented concerns a group 
of migrants who were historically among the most privileged of the migrant groups 
in Turkey, but whose legal status has significantly shifted over the last two decades 
to become one of systematic irregularity. The trajectory of the Bulgarian Turkish 
immigrants—from prospective citizens to dispensable labour migrants—renders all 
the more cogent the contingent nature of legality.
This chapter begins by providing a historical and contemporary overview that 
traces the striking shifts in the legal status of the Bulgarian Turkish migrants. Si-
multaneously, it brings out the specificity of this particular case by drawing com-
parisons with immigration policies towards ‘ethnic return migrants’ in other nation 
states, with a special focus on the Southern Balkans. It then goes on to locate the 
unique narratives of three migrants within this broader structure, reading their sto-
ries against the grain of the prevailing legal designations. The analyses of this chap-
ter are based primarily on qualitative data gathered through ethnographic fieldwork 
conducted over 2007–2011 among Turkish migrants from Bulgaria.2 During field-
work, the main anthropological methods of participant observation and open-ended 
interviews were deployed. As distinct from other qualitative research, however, it 
should be stressed that true to the spirit of ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973), the vi-
gnettes presented here are the result of multiple encounters that spanned 4 years and 
different institutional and recreational sites rather than single interviews conducted 
in one sitting or setting.
6.1  The Migration of the Bulgarian Turks from Bulgaria 
to Turkey: A Story of Falling from Grace?
Starting with the founding of the Republic in 1923 and extending to 1989, migrants 
from Bulgaria with claims to Turkish ethnicity have received citizenship on the basis 
of an immigration policy that grants citizenship to those of Turkish descent (Kirișci 
2000). But the favouring of the immigration of those deemed as co-ethnics is not 
2 This chapter is based on ethnographic research funded by two TÜBITAK projects. The first one, 
‘A Comparative Analysis of Informal Networks among Bulgarian Turks, Iraqi Turks and Moldavi-
ans’ was a collaborative project undertaken together with Didem Danış and Mine Eder and carried 
out between January 2007 and June 2008. The second project, entitled, ‘The Legalization Practices 
among Turkish Immigrants from Bulgaria’ took place between 2009 and 2012.
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unique to the Turkish nation state and should first be situated within a comparative 
perspective. After the settlement of the Asia Minor refugees in (northern) Greece in 
1922, the Greek government continued to settle ‘repatriates’ ( palinnostoundes)—
primarily Greeks from the former Soviet Union—under a special, more favour-
able regulation that differs from the constitutional regulations that other migrants in 
Greece are subjected to (Baldwin-Edwards and Kyriakou 2004). Similarly, around 
4 million individuals of German descent ( Aussiedler) from Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union migrated to Germany under the legal auspices of ‘the right of 
return’ defined by the post-war German constitution. Other well-studied cases of 
‘return’ migrations framed in terms of ethno-national identity include the migra-
tion of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel (Remennick 2003), Hungarians from 
Romania to Hungary (Fox 2009), and Japanese from Brazil to Japan (Tsuda 2003).
However, such ‘policy favoritism’ towards ethnic return migrants, as Voutira 
terms it for the Greek context, has been subject to certain shifts since the 1990s, ren-
dering legalization more arduous in both the Greek and the German contexts. In line 
with what seems to be a general trend in South-eastern Europe as well as at large, in 
Turkey, too, departure from ethnic favouritism may be observed with regard to the 
‘ethnic kin’ migrating from Bulgaria to Turkey, who have been rendered systemati-
cally irregular since the 1990s. After providing a brief overview of the history of 
the reception of immigrants from Bulgaria, I will probe further the question of why 
Turkey seems to have departed from its previous attitude and adopted a different 
policy in the last two decades.
Historically, the Balkan Turks represent the most privileged migrant group in 
terms of access and acceptability. In legal terms, this privilege was enabled by the 
ethnicist bias of the first Settlement Law of 1934, which reserved the definition of 
migrants exclusively to those of Turkish descent and culture (Erder 2000; Kirișci 
2000). The same definition still holds in the most recent Settlement Law of 2006. 
That is to say, only those who can prove Turkish descent or affinity to Turkish cul-
ture are legally designated as göçmen (migrant); the rest are simply called ‘foreign-
ers’, in legal parlance.
In addition to this structural positive discrimination in the law towards co-eth-
nics, we also observe what Danıș and I have elsewhere called the ‘hierarchy of 
migrant desirability’—even within migrant groups that claim Turkish ethnicity 
(Danıș and Parla 2009; see also Çağaptay 2003). While ‘those of Turkish culture 
and descent’ include other Turkish Muslim groups, such as Circassians, Afghans, 
and Turkmen who have also historically had more privileged access to citizenship 
(Çağaptay 2003; Kirișci 2000; Kadırbeyoğlu 2007), co-ethnics from the Balkans 
occupy the top echelons among those deemed as ethnic kin. Of the tens of thousands 
naturalized in accordance with Law 1312, the foremost recipients of citizenship 
during the founding years of the Republic were migrants from the Balkans (Kirișci 
2000; İçduygu 2003). Indeed, this hospitable attitude towards the Balkan migrants 
was resented, especially among conservative Muslim groups, for being partisan 
(Bora and Şen 2009). On a comparative note, contemporary immigration policies 
in Greece confer a preferential status on Albanian citizens of Greek origin and yet 
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present them with fewer benefits when compared to Greeks from the former Soviet 
Union. Voutira (2004) thus suggests the similar analytic frame of a ‘hierarchy of 
Greekness’, to describe the differential criteria used to determine inclusion and ex-
clusion, even for those identified as omoyeneis (same origin)—as Danıș and I do for 
those identified as soydaş in the Turkish context.
One explanation for the preferential treatment of Balkan Turks is that after the 
Balkan War of 1912, the migrants fleeing the lost lands of the Ottoman Empire 
helped to cement Turkish nationalism (Canefe 2002; Köroğlu 2004), especially 
through what Keyder (2005) calls their ‘revanchist’ attitude. The desirability of 
these migrants seems to have stemmed also from their being seen as the last, teeter-
ing claim on Europe and Europeanness. Significant as well is the fact that the popu-
lation from the Balkans was settled so as to compensate for the scarcity of human 
labour; and capital and property belonging to the exiled and massacred Greek and 
Armenian minorities was transferred to the newcomers to facilitate the formation 
of a local Muslim bourgeoisie (Keyder 1987; Akçam 1992). The migration of the 
Balkan Turks to Turkey was thus encouraged as part of the nationalist effort to cre-
ate the semblance of a homogeneous Turkish homeland populated by ‘ethnically 
pure’ Turks.
The Cold War further reinforced the privileged treatment of Turkish migrants 
from Bulgaria. In 1950–1951, 150,000 were granted citizenship (Eminov 1997). 
This wave was primarily composed of migrants who resisted communist policies 
and particularly the collectivization of land in Bulgaria. They were, therefore, par-
ticularly welcome from the point of the Turkish state, not only in terms of their 
ethnic identification but also in line with Cold War ideology. Similarly, in 1989, 
when more than 300,000 Turks fleeing ethnic repression in Bulgaria arrived at the 
Turkish border, they were accepted with much ethnic zeal and political fanfare as 
kindred fleeing the oppression of a communist regime. Such utilization of Cold War 
rivalry through the movement of migrants resonates with the German case as well, 
where ethnic German immigration was cited by West German politicians as proof 
of the superiority of the West German nation state and economic system (Münz and 
Ohlinger 2003, p. 189).
However, the privileged treatment of the Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria was 
to change considerably after 1989. Migrations from Bulgaria to Turkey continued 
apace in the 1990s, given the failing economy in Bulgaria after the fall of com-
munism and the employment opportunities in the informal sector in Turkey. But 
the migrants arriving after the 1990s no longer had the same access to citizenship. 
Throughout the 1990s and up until 2001, Bulgarian nationals wishing to come to 
Turkey needed to obtain a tourist visa to leave Bulgaria. At the Turkish consulates 
in Bulgaria, visas were granted to only one member per family. This was not an of-
ficial rule, but the accounts of my respondents suggest that this was routine practice. 
Given the increasing difficulty of getting tourist visas, people began to seek illegal 
routes to reach Turkey, either in search of jobs or to unite with a partner who had 
already migrated.
In 2001, the Turkish government lifted the visa requirement for Bulgarian na-
tionals. This was a response to Bulgaria’s removal from the ‘negative’ Schengen 
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list—that is, the list of countries approved by the EU whose citizens must have 
a visa—and inclusion in the list of countries whose citizens are exempt from the 
requirement of having a visa (‘the positive list’) to travel within the Schengen area, 
which currently consists of 25 European countries. From 2001 to May 2007, Bul-
garian nationals could thus enter Turkey on visa waivers valid for 3 months. In 
May 2007, yet another new visa agreement came into effect. The former procedure 
that permitted Bulgarian nationals’ legal stay as tourists on visa waivers valid for 3 
months was replaced by permission to stay for a maximum of 90 days in a 6-month 
period. The new visa regime was the result of a bilateral agreement signed between 
Bulgaria and Turkey, which in turn ensued from the ongoing harmonization with the 
Schengen visa regime. In the wider context of the EU, the new procedure harmo-
nized the conditions for migration from Bulgaria to EU countries, on the one hand, 
and from Bulgaria to Turkey, on the other, by granting the right to free movement 
for Bulgarian passport holders within the whole Schengen area as well as in Tur-
key for a maximum of 90 days within a 6-month period. However, for the labour 
migrants who come to work in Turkey—mostly in the domestic sector—the 90 day 
limit has meant the stark choice between losing their jobs or lapsing into illegality.
The bigger question, then, asked also by the migrants themselves with much ex-
asperation, is why Turkey seems to be letting go of its policy of favouritism towards 
the Turkish-speaking migrants from Bulgaria—initially, gradually throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s and more exactingly after 2007? The full explanation cannot 
be reduced to the impact of the EU and harmonization with the Schengen regime 
and needs to take into account a constellation of other factors.
One answer may have to do with the shift in the symbolic utility of the migrants 
from Bulgaria. As far as the state is concerned, the desirability of Bulgarian Turkish 
migrants may have waned after the end of the Cold War, since the discourse of ‘sav-
ing ethnic kin’ from communist oppression no longer had the same symbolic use 
and validity.3 Another reason, which we have explored in detail elsewhere (Kașlı 
and Parla 2009; Danıș and Parla 2009) has to do with the political instrumentaliza-
tion of Bulgarian Turkish migrants as potential voters for the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms—the party in Bulgaria that represents the Turkish minority. At the 
time of each national election in Bulgaria, the Turkish government announces am-
nesties that grant 3- or 6-month residence permits to those who are illegal at the 
time. While no direct proof of voting is required to gain the permit, both the timing 
and the semi-official discourse by migrant associations and employers at the For-
eigner’s Department explicitly link the amnesties to the elections in Bulgaria. In 
fact, in 2009 some migrant associations even went so far as to say that those unable 
to prove that they had cast a vote would not be able to benefit from the amnesty—an 
unfounded claim that nonetheless reveals the instrumentalization of migrants’ ir-
regularity for the transnational political interests of the state.
3 A different, almost reverse version of the argument regarding the significance of communism, 
suggesting suspicion that after 50 years of communism these migrants had become less desirable 
is made by Hann and Beller-Hann (1998).
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A related argument may have to do with what Glick-Schiller and Fouron (1998) 
discuss under the rubric of the ‘deterritoralization of the nation state’, a state of 
affairs that embodies not a move away from nation-state sovereignty, but rather, a 
re-envisioning of the state as expanding beyond its national borders to appropriate 
and vie for the loyalty of its ‘nationals’ abroad.4 Finally, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, immigration policies in Turkey—as elsewhere—are shaped by the demands 
of the neoliberal labour market for cheap and vulnerable labour. This demand is best 
met by undocumented migrants.
In his book, Selecting by Origin, Christian Joppke (2005) explores ethnic migra-
tion in various liberal states, and points to various and often countervailing trends of 
de-ethnicization and re-ethnicization as manifested in and through migration policy. 
He locates the main tension as being between, on one hand, the favouring of ethnic 
migration for national identity reasons, and on the other hand, the increasing pre-
dominance of liberal-universalistic principles over parochially national ones.
I agree with Joppke in that to explain the change in policy towards the Bulgarian 
Turks, we should consider a variety of factors, not all of which are necessarily al-
ways in harmony with one another. Nor should the change necessarily be interpret-
ed as a decisive, finely orchestrated break with the past. Elsewhere I have argued 
that the privilege of ethnic kinship continues to be smuggled in through the back 
door, despite the fact that the new Citizenship Law of 2010 purportedly eliminated 
all references to positive discrimination based on ethnicity (Parla 2011). However, 
unlike Joppke, who suggests that to the extent that ethnic migration is constrained, 
it is constrained by liberal norms of rights, I suggest that the historical privilege of 
ethnic kinship competes primarily with market concerns. Rather than the increasing 
pressure exerted by human rights ideals that restrain ethnic favouritism, as Joppke 
would have it, I locate the main tension in the struggle between the neoliberal labour 
market and ethnic citizenship.
Perhaps we could also interpret the cases of Greece and Germany, where ethnic 
kinship is being rendered more tenuous as a stepping stone towards legality, in a 
similar light. Although Greece continues its policy favouritism towards the omoy-
eneis, the reception of migrants from the FSU is not as unqualified as it was in 1989 
and the early 1990s. After a shift towards containment between 1995 and 2000, 
the criteria for acceptance have become stricter since 2001—requiring proof not 
just of Greek descent, but also of ‘the individual’s possession of a Greek national 
consciousness’ (Voutira 2004, p. 538). Similarly, for Germany, the right to return 
for those ‘belonging to the German people’ ( Volkszugehörigkeit) has been more 
strictly regulated since the 1990s. In addition to the introduction of quotas, German 
resettlers now need to apply for immigration permission prior to arrival and in their 
countries of origin, and to pass a language test to confirm their Volkszugehörigkeit 
status (Dietz 1999).
4 From a historical viewpoint, this is probably not a new phenomenon at all: retaining a loyal con-
tingency outside of its sovereign territory to strengthen its international interests has always been 
a tool of international politics.
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A full analysis of the shifts in policy in each of these different national settings 
is beyond the scope of this chapter. What I want to underscore through these com-
parative examples is that legal status is a contingent category that is not decided in 
accordance with, for example, the right to mobility as a fundamental human right, 
as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.5 Rather, legal status is 
designated through the interplay of the sometimes complementary, sometimes com-
peting, forces around political interests, international relations, and the demands 
of the market. The migrants who continue to do in 2009 what they were doing in 
2006, or in 1998, or in 1989, may thus find themselves constantly walking the tight-
rope between legality and illegality—performing as best they can a balancing act 
amidst constantly changing visa regulations. The next section seeks to capture how 
migrants themselves experience states of ‘legality’ and ‘illegality’, with the aim 
of demonstrating not only the arbitrariness of state policies where migrants’ lives 
are concerned but also the inadequacy of the terms ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ in both the 
normative and empirical sense.
6.2  ‘For us, Migration is Ordinary’
When Gülcan came to Istanbul in 2006 with her parents and her brother, she was 
23 years old. Two years before, she had come on her own, stayed with her aunt for 
a year, working as a babysitter and saving money to complete her university degree 
in economics in Bulgaria. In 2006, the flexible visa regime was still in effect, en-
abling Gülcan to keep her residence status regular by exiting and re-entering every 
3 months. However, she worked in the informal domestic market as a babysitter 
without a work permit—an act that rendered her ‘illegal’. Already then, we have the 
first instance of illegality in which almost all migrant women from Bulgaria found 
themselves at that time—legal in terms of residence, illegal in terms of work. Up 
until 2003, foreigners were not allowed to work as domestics anyway; since the 
2003 regulation concerning foreigners’ work permits, it has technically been pos-
sible to get a permit for domestic work. However, ethnographic evidence—as well 
as statistics on how many people have obtained the permit to date—reveal its inac-
cessibility given the costs and intricacy of the bureaucracy entailed (Erder 2000; 
İçduygu 2003).6
Gülcan’s mother had come to Turkey even earlier, in 1997, on a tourist visa, 
when the Turkish consulates in Bulgaria were issuing a visa to only one member per 
family. Gülcan’s mother overstayed her visa and worked informally as a domestic 
5 Also relevant is Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. My thanks 
to Hans Vermeulen for this reminder.
6 During the course of fieldwork, I have indeed met one employer who obtained a work permit for 
her domestic worker. She did so through a lawyer’s firm that specializes in these permits and asks 
for about 3000 $ for the task. Once I had this information, I passed it on to the employers of several 
migrant workers I knew; none, to date, have actually pursued this option.
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for 3 years. Eight years prior to that, in 1989 when Gülcan was still a child, they 
had migrated to Turkey as a family. However, because her father never felt at ease 
in Turkey, they returned before receiving Turkish citizenship, which was granted to 
those who came in 1989 and settled.
This time around, the father was able to survive only 2 years in Turkey and went 
back to Bulgaria in 2008, his wife following shortly afterwards. Gülcan’s brother 
and his wife stayed on until 2010, but they too recently left for Bulgaria, although 
the bride wants to come back to Turkey and they are undecided as to where they will 
settle. Gülcan herself is adamant about staying, even if that means she will be with-
out papers. But this does not necessarily mean she is committed to staying for good:
First let me get my papers and then we will see. I cannot entirely give up on Bulgaria, either. 
For us, there is always going back and forth, we can never say, ‘this is it, I am settled for 
good’. Migration is a part of our lives. In Bulgaria, too, everyone always went somewhere 
else to work. For us, migration is ordinary, completely normal.
Gülcan’s normalization of migration as ordinary and the recurrent movement of 
other members of her family back and forth subvert the nationalist narrative within 
which the 1989 migration was subsumed as a unique event of homecoming (Parla 
2006). Gülcan’s articulation of their migration routine, within which the passage 
across the border in 1989 is just one among many other subsequent migratory move-
ments, also challenges the allegedly sharp contrast between the 1989 migration, 
framed by the government and nationalist discourse as a purely political migration, 
and the post-1990s migratory movements as a purely economic. Finally, Gülcan’s 
effortless inclusion of other geographies within her mental map of possible migra-
tion routes severs the seamless connection between Bulgaria and Turkey which the 
Turkish state has historically posited for its ‘kindred in exile’.
After their return to Bulgaria in 1989, Gülcan’s father worked intermittently in 
Germany despite being caught and deported twice. Gülcan joined him after high 
school to give Germany a try herself. ‘They don’t treat you very well there if you 
are Turkish. I cannot stand things like that, so I went back to Bulgaria.’ After finish-
ing a bachelor’s degree in economics, she also did a master’s degree in accounting 
through a certificate programme. Although this degree is not recognized in Turkey, 
it is the area in which Gülcan wants to pursue a career. That is why she refuses to 
work as a babysitter this time around: ‘I put up with it then because my goal was 
to finish school. But I won’t sell myself short now. I want to have a proper career.’ 
Gülcan worked for a while as an intern at a maritime company. Once the internship 
was over, however, the company did not want to deal with the bureaucracy involved 
in getting her a work permit. She contacted various other companies, ‘and it was 
always the same thing: without documents, you are always treated like you are 
nothing. No papers, no insurance: it is precarious for us.’
When the new regulation came into effect in May 2007, allowing Bulgarian na-
tionals only 90 days of stay within a 6-month period, Gülcan said that she went 
everywhere in search of information, from the Consulate to the Foreigner’s Depart-
ment. Everyone told her something different. She also heard rumours about the 
possibility of a free permit being granted as amnesty right before the elections in 
Bulgaria to encourage migrant voting. Knowing that a similar amnesty had been 
6 ‘For us, Migration is Ordinary’ 113
granted in 2005, Gülcan decided to stay and risk illegality. Indeed, the 6-month 
residence permits were granted this time around as well, regardless of prior legal 
status. Paradoxically, those who abided by the new visa regime and went back to 
Bulgaria after the 90 day limit could not benefit from the amnesty. ‘In panic, they 
ended up not only paying the penalty (for late exit) but they could not come back to 
Turkey for 3 months either’, Gülcan said. ‘So [I’m] glad we did not go. This all goes 
to show that illegal stuff rules the day in Turkey. Those who play by the rules simply 
lose.’ Indeed, the irony not lost on Gülcan of losing when playing by the rules was a 
major source of discontent among the many migrants who found themselves in the 
same situation. Ethnographic evidence even suggests that these amnesties—which 
only reward, as it were, those who lapse into illegality—have increased the number 
of migrants who risk illegality instead of abiding by the 90 days visa regulation.
Each time we went for our permits, [Gülcan said,] the migrant association leaders and 
officials told us, ‘We are giving these for the elections. So that you will vote.’ There was 
always talk of this sort. It is all very explicit. These [permits] are for the elections. They 
even said that they would send the list of people who voted—you know, we had signed our 
names at the municipality—that they would send this list of names to the consulate. This 
would count as evidence, they said, and the ones not on the list would not get the six-month 
renewal. Nothing of the sort happened, of course; still, we did not want to risk it and went. 
You cannot imagine what torture it was going to Bulgaria that night. No seats on the buses, 
since everyone was going.
While the threat of sending a list to the consulate is only that—a threat—such semi-
formal talk circulating among officials and migrant association leaders is revealing 
in terms of how these amnesties are experienced on the ground. Gülcan, too, is per-
fectly aware of the emptiness of the threat. Yet, she ‘did not want to risk it’, putting 
up with the requirements so as to maximize whatever chance at temporary legality 
is thrown her way.
The 6-month permit did not turn out to be renewable. Between April 2008– when 
the permit expired—and June 2009, Gülcan resided in Turkey without papers. It 
was only more than a year later, at the end of June 2009, that she was able to regu-
larize her status with yet another amnesty—again, before the elections in Bulgaria. 
While partly relieved, Gülcan was also discouraged that this permit was only for 
3 months and once again non-renewable. ‘I will get the permit, but this time I will 
not vote’, she said defiantly:
They are literally playing with us. In any case, those who live here could not care less about 
the elections in Bulgaria… Now I do not know what to do. And my mother keeps saying, 
‘Don’t waste your time there.’ You know, I had hoped that something would happen with 
this election. Perhaps a one-year residence permit, or perhaps one that I could extend. And 
then a work permit. And then it would not be a dream to apply for citizenship… But when 
I hear that this permit is only for three months, I think to myself, why should I bother stay-
ing? But then I am used to it, I have my routine. It is hard to leave now. I spent my last three 
years here. I put up a certain fight. If I give up all that, what will I have left, why did I come 
then? And although my father could get me a job at the municipality back in our town, I 
don’t think I will be content with working in a small town after life in the city.
Currently, Gülcan works as an accountant for a small company. As far as her boss is 
concerned, her not having a work permit does not pose a problem. ‘Even those with 
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citizenship work without social security in small firms, so they don’t care.’ Given 
the restructuring that the company is undergoing and the expertise that Gülcan has 
accumulated, she feels she has become indispensable and hopes for a promotion 
soon.
Gülcan returned briefly to Bulgaria after her 3 months was up, thus ‘earning’ 
another 3 months of stay in Turkey. Through the informal services of a self-declared 
‘legal advisor’, whose actual credentials are those of a translator, she filed a petition 
with the Ministry to renew her permit, where she was advised to specify that she 
had relatives in Turkey and that she was single. The ‘legal advisor’ highlighted this 
latter point as being critical in evaluation of the applications. He submitted all her 
documents and gave her a phone number for an office in Ankara to follow up on 
her petition. Since December 2009, then, Gülcan has been residing without papers 
(given that her residency has expired); yet technically, she is non-deportable as long 
as she has a standing application with the Ministry. She has still not received a reply 
and is reluctant to follow up on it herself. ‘See, to tell you the truth, I am anxious 
to go. I don’t know what they might do; that is, in fact, why I keep putting it off.’
However, after a recent incident with the police, Gülcan says that she has changed 
her mind and will follow up her application more closely. Until then, Gülcan had 
not had any encounters with the police because of her not having papers. A couple 
of months ago, however, she was stopped by a police officer, who was conducting 
identity checks in front of the central mosque in a neighbourhood with a significant 
immigrant population. Her boyfriend was with her. When Gülcan showed her pass-
port, the police officer said, ‘Oh-oh, your 90 days have long expired.’ Gülcan told 
him that she had petitioned to Ankara for an extension, and showed him the receipt 
for the petition. The officer said, ‘How do I know you have a residence permit? 
Where is that?’ Gülcan told him that she did not carry all her documents with her 
for fear of theft. The officer insisted on seeing it, and asked her to come to the police 
station, while someone else could go to her house and procure the document. Based 
on past experience, Gülcan did not trust that the officers at the station would under-
stand the full details of her situation. She was not sure whether she could explain 
it herself. She realized that the officer was after a bribe when he said, ‘Look here, 
sweetie, isn’t it a shame that you two will have to spend your whole Sunday at the 
police station? What could we do about this?’ So they gave him all the cash they had 
with them, amounting to 120 $, and he let them go.
6.3  ‘No Matter What we do, Nothing Comes of it…’
While it is true that single women on the move are increasingly becoming the pat-
tern for many migrant groups in Turkey (see, e.g., Akalın 2007; Kașka 2006; Ke-
ough 2006), the migrants from Bulgaria both partake in and challenge this trend in 
that often the entire family migrates. Aysel and Hasan, now aged 32 and 35, came to 
Turkey with their son 14 years ago with the aid of a smuggling network. The main 
motivation for their initial migration to Turkey was to be able to pay the gambling 
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debts that Hasan had accumulated in Bulgaria. They had one other option: Hasan, 
who worked as a house painter, was offered a painting job in Belgium through an 
acquaintance and was promised 2000 marks per month. He would have gone alone, 
leaving Aysel and their son behind. Yet Aysel did not want the family to be separat-
ed. So it was Hasan who first passed the Turkish border in 1996, entrusting himself 
to a group of ‘kanalcı’, which is slang for ‘smugglers’. Aysel undertook the journey 
with her son, then 3 years old. They walked from 10 at night to 5 in the morning, 
passing under barbed wire. ‘He was so small then, and it was night. He wanted to 
sleep, he wanted his bed, he wanted his comfort. We had to carry him all the way; 
he cried a lot. Fortunately, there were many men in the group and they helped carry 
him. I could not stand on my feet for at least a week afterwards.’
Aysel and Hasan stayed in the migrant settlements located where Aysel’s mother 
lives. The mother had immigrated in 1989, and she was the one who paid the smug-
glers. In retrospect, Aysel is somewhat regretful about the decision to come to Tur-
key: ‘If I had known it would turn out to be like this here, I would have urged him 
to go to Belgium. To have to resort to those means [meaning the smugglers], to have 
struggled so much; it just was not worth it… We thought we would work a bit and 
then go back.’ However, when their child began school, they felt that he would have 
a better chance in Turkey and that he could no longer adapt to life in Bulgaria. It 
was a struggle to get Olcay allowed to attend school. Hasan had to go to the school 
every day, along with three other mothers whose children could not be registered 
because of their irregular status. They pleaded, insisted and protested; in the end, it 
was the principal’s advocacy that they were able to get the children the necessary 
residence permits to attend school. Once their son had the certificate, Aysel and 
Hasan qualified for the ‘accompanying person permit’ ( refakatçi izni)—a special 
residence permit given to those who are accompanying minors, the elderly, or the 
sick. Each time Hasan had to go to the Foreigner’s Department to renew the permit, 
he encountered the same problem: he would be told that the date of the permit had 
expired. Hasan explained that he could renew the permit only when Olcay’s school 
opened again in the autumn, which meant that there was an inevitable gap of 3 
months between the date of expiration and the date of renewal. ‘I have not left the 
country, I am renewing the permit’, I said to them. ‘“You still have to pay”, they 
would tell me. Once I went to speak with the head officer. He could not care less. 
“What is it to me?” he asked. That really blew my fuses. He said, “We will just get 
you and throw you out”. I said, “Okay, then throw me out”’. Aysel intervened: ‘I 
hate going to the Foreigner’s Department. Hasan gets angry and I end up paying 
the price.’ ‘But you inquire about something’, Hasan said in self-defence, ‘and they 
never answer properly. Each time you go back, they find yet another missing docu-
ment. Each time, I lose a day’s worth of work. And I have to get in the queue at five 
in the morning. In the end, you just lose it, you know.’
Aysel and Hasan live in an extremely well-kept little flat in an otherwise di-
lapidated migrant settlement in an outer Istanbul suburb that hosts a low-income 
population. Such settlements were commissioned by the state for the earlier wave of 
1989 migrants, but they were not completed on time. Meanwhile, most of the 1989 
migrants were able to move into better housing and the flats were left to deteriorate. 
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Some have rented out these flats to post-1990s migrants, like Hasan and Aysel, for 
very low rates. Aysel currently works as in domestic services and Hasan works for 
a heating company. His employer is a 1989 migrant from Bulgaria and did not mind 
Hasan going to Denmark for a few months to do a temporary painting job; most of 
the people in the company are without insurance, anyway. Prior to this job, Hasan 
worked as a security guard for a gated community. Although the residents really 
liked him, even trusting him with their children when they ran errands, he was 
eventually fired because the residents were afraid that if he were be injured—an 
anxiety exacerbated by the gangs that had proliferated in the vicinity—they them-
selves would get in trouble for employing someone without papers. Hasan toys with 
the idea of migrating to a European country. ‘If worse comes to worse, I would go 
temporarily, work and come back.’
At the end of the summer of 2009, Hasan and Aysel went to the Registrar’s 
Office to ‘have their days counted’, and were told that they had acquired enough 
days to apply for citizenship. In addition to completing the various required docu-
ments, including a document of origin that ‘proves’ their Turkish ethnicity, they 
were warned to make sure that the names on the Bulgarian and Turkish documents 
matched—a major concern since transliteration from the Cyrillic alphabet results 
in different spellings and even a single letter causes a file to be disqualified. It 
took Hasan and Aysel a month to collect all the documents and official stamps and 
cost more than a thousand dollars. With their completed file, they went back to the 
registrar, only to be told that they were not eligible to apply after all. Their 2 years’ 
worth of residence permits based on the special permit of accompanying a minor 
no longer qualified for citizenship applications. It turned out that the regulation al-
lowing this special permit had already been revoked when they went to inquire at 
the Civil Registry, but the officer had not informed them of the change—perhaps 
because he himself did not know.
When they sought advice from the most active Balkan migrants’ association in 
Istanbul, the president told them that in their situation, the only option was to try the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ clause of the new 2010 Citizenship Law. Exceptional 
circumstances apply to those of Turkish origin and with a relative of the first or 
second degree who is a Turkish citizen. They could try this route because Aysel’s 
mother was already a citizen. The president of the association said that he had filed 
about 150 such applications. ‘We are certain to get positive results’, he said confi-
dently, and added with visible sarcasm, ‘Let us hope that they do not change the new 
citizenship law yet again. So I would urge you to hurry.’ The price for processing the 
applications for the whole family would be 4000 TL (3500 $), he said, which they 
could pay in three instalments.
After the meeting with the association president, Aysel was in high spirits. ‘We 
have already spent so much, we can risk this much more’, she said. She began cal-
culating who could contribute how much. ‘All right then’, she said with playful de-
fiance, ‘if Mr. Hasan still wants to go, let him go’. After the terrible disappointment 
at the Civil Registry the day before, Hasan had called his brother in Bulgaria and 
said, ‘I don’t care if they are staying or not; I’ve had it and I am joining you.’ But 
Aysel felt differently. ‘We bought all this furniture; we have an arrangement here. 
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How will we start from scratch there again? Even moving the furniture would cost 
a lot of money. So I would rather pay the 4000 TL, if only I knew it would work.’ 
Aysel went on planning in delighted chatter for a bit longer, then suddenly stopped 
in her tracks:
Actually I don’t even know what we will do with this citizenship. I really do not know why 
we even want it… If it had not been for the three-month rule, I would not put so much effort 
into all this. But if we were to get citizenship, we could go back and forth without worries, 
otherwise, we have to constantly struggle with these permits.
Five months later, they had not done anything. They decided that they could not risk 
investing that much money in something they had no reason to trust. When asked 
if they planned on doing anything before all the documents they had collected for 
the citizenship application expired, Hasan said, ‘No, not really. You saw it too, no 
matter what we do, nothing comes out of it. Perhaps there will be another amnesty, 
or the regulations will change or something.’ Meanwhile, Hasan has a new job as a 
ground cleaner at the airport for 400 $ a month, no bonuses. He is hoping to switch 
to another airport firm that offers a luggage-carrying service—a more demanding 
job, but with better pay. The best part, he says, is that he is insured for the first time.
6.4  Harmonizing ‘Illegality’
A circular entitled ‘Fighting Illegal Migration’, issued by the Turkish Ministry of 
Interior on 19 March 2010 states that Turkey will step up its measures to prevent 
illegal migration as part of its ninth national programme and its concomitant com-
mitment to meet the requirements for EU accession in the realm of policy con-
cerning refugees and immigration. The circular states, among other directives, that 
bus companies and hotels will be regularly warned about human trafficking and 
that relevant personnel will take part in training programmes in which they will be 
taught to ‘evaluate those signs likely to reveal the existence of illegal migration, 
such as the purchase of large quantities of bread from the bakeries, left-over food in 
vehicles, heavy smell emanating from vehicles, the increase in unknown guests in 
the villages’ (Ministry of Interior press release 2010/22).
Juxtaposing this press release against the stories of Aysel, Hasan, and Gülcan 
reveals a jarring discord between, on one hand, reduction of migrant ‘illegality’ 
to smells emanating from vehicles and the stealthy consumption of bread, and on 
the other hand, the everyday experiences of people like Aysel, Hasan, and Gülcan, 
which revolve around routine life including work, children, school, and outings. 
The depiction of illegal migration by the state as something completely undercover 
not only distorts the wide range of how illegality is experienced in everyday life but 
also further reinforces the criminalization of migrants. As the stories above describe 
in detail, migrants like Gülcan, Hasan, and Aysel—who, at one time or another, 
reside and work without the papers that particular national boundaries require of 
them—still pursue career opportunities and dreams, seek work and security, and go 
about their daily lives in as ordinary and dignified a manner as possible.
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Secondly, the rhetoric about control or fighting ‘illegal migration’ does not ad-
dress the question of arbitrariness of the law-in-practice (Koğacıoğlu 2009). After 
an identity check, the police may let those without documents go if they are paid a 
bribe, as when Gülcan was stopped with her boyfriend. An inadequately informed 
or unwilling official may fail to mention the crucial information that ‘accompany-
ing person’ permits are no longer valid for citizenship applications, thus causing 
candidates to waste money and effort, as well as losing hope of legalization. Arbi-
trariness also serves as a politics of ‘wearing out’. Many migrants do not attempt 
to regularize their status in the first place because of the opacity of the bureaucratic 
process, or they give up midway because of unexpectedly changed requirements of 
which they are not duly informed. Gülcan’s disillusionment with the amnesties that 
only regularize status temporarily; Hasan’s frustration with renewing the permit 
where each time he is held accountable for the inevitable 3-month gap because of 
the summer school holiday; Aysel and Hasan’s failed application for citizenship be-
cause of a change in the regulation: these all add up to the exasperation summed up 
poignantly in Hasan’s remonstration, ‘No matter what we do, nothing comes of it!’
If language not only reflects but also constitutes our reality, we need to ask what 
in fact gets occluded through the terminology of legality and illegality that pur-
ports only to describe and categorize migrants. At the empirical level, what Gül-
can, Hasan, and Aysel’s stories demonstrate is that the line between legality and 
illegality is much harder to pin down than the dichotomy suggests. Gülcan entered 
the country ‘legally,’ but lapsed into illegality when she worked without a permit. 
Currently, she is ‘illegal’ in terms of her residence status, but given that she has 
registered a petition with the Ministry of Interior, she is non-deportable. However, 
this does not stop the police from exploiting her vulnerable status. Hasan and Aysel 
are periodically able to renew their accompanying persons permit through their son 
who attends school. Yet they have a built-in interruption to their ‘legal’ status be-
cause of the summer holiday. Since they cannot apply for citizenship with this type 
of residence permit, once their son finishes school, the legal basis on which they 
reside will disappear.
At the normative level, there is further reason to be wary of the rhetoric of fight-
ing illegal migration. Much of the rhetoric of control and restriction in fact goes 
hand in hand with a certain degree of tacit tolerance in accordance with the dictates 
of the labour market. It is thus not a coincidence that those designated as illegal are, 
for the most part, migrant workers—as global capitalism with its constant restruc-
turing needs a flexible and disposable workforce (Bauman 2007; Sassen 1996). 
Many employers are indifferent, as Gülcan, Hasan, and Aysel’s work situations 
demonstrate; in fact, they may prefer to employ those without papers. The state 
meets market demand by tolerating informal employment to a certain degree. In 
fact, some scholars go further and speak of the legal production of illegality, claim-
ing that the law systematically reproduces the irregularity of migrants in order to 
ensure a vulnerable and dispensable workforce (Calavita 1998; De Genova 2005). 
De Genova also suggests that it is deportability, not deportation per se, that is the 
most strategic tool for ensuring migrant vulnerability. Rather than being deported en 
masse, migrants live under the constant threat of deportation, rendering them even 
more vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of the police or employers.
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If, as De Genova (2007, p. 436) urges us, ‘we begin not from the epistemological 
standpoint of the state and its functionaries but rather, from the standpoint of the 
elementary freedom of movement as a basic human entitlement’, and not presup-
pose that there is something inherently suspect about human beings who migrate, 
then we need to be more critical of both official and scholarly designations of mi-
grant illegality. This chapter has aimed to contribute to this awareness, already po-
liticized by activist networks around the world, by demonstrating how illegality is 
experienced by a migrant group in Turkey that has historically occupied the most 
privileged position in the hierarchy of migrant desirability. Tracing the trajectory of 
a migrant group from prospective citizens to dispensable migrants underscores the 
historically specific condition of legality and illegality and demonstrates that legal-
ity is not a secure condition even for apparently privileged migrants.
Finally, it is within this historically contingent, unpredictable, and often arbitrary 
matrix of illegality that the most recent regulation concerning Bulgarian nationals 
of Turkish origin should be viewed. At the time of this writing, the Ministry of In-
ternal Affairs had just released a circular announcing an amnesty in the form of free 
6-month residence permits for Bulgarian Turks who were currently without papers 
(12 June 2011). This amnesty in itself is not unique, as this chapter has elaborated. 
What is unprecedented, however, is the accompanying clause in the circular that 
enables Bulgarian nationals who can prove Turkish origins and who have Turkish-
citizen relatives of the first or second degree to apply for citizenship under the ‘ex-
ceptional status’ clause, even if they do not fulfil the 5 years of uninterrupted resi-
dence required by the current Citizenship Law. During the months of June and July 
2011, thousands of migrants (including those mentioned here) practically held camp 
at the Foreigner’s Department and the Civil Registry, trying to obtain information, 
procure the necessary documents, and submit their application before the desig-
nated September deadline. Thus, the tide appears to have turned: are the Bulgarian 
Turkish migrants, after two decades of loss of privilege, again becoming the most 
likely candidates for citizenship? It would be too hasty to offer a definite answer be-
fore witnessing the actual fate of the thousands of applications being filed with the 
Ministry.7 Regardless of the outcome, however, the struggles of the migrants from 
Bulgaria in Turkey are an apt reminder of the fact that states of legality are elusive 
even for those migrants designated as ethnic kin, and that states of illegality are de-
fied daily by the lived experiences of migrants who insist on finding work, sending 
their children to school, or taking a stroll with their loved ones on the streets—with 
or without documents.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
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7 Of the two major Balkan migrant associations, the Balkan Turks Solidarity Association represen-
tative is sceptical and the İzmir BAL-GÖC representative speaks with caution regarding the actual 
outcome of these applications. Interview with Balkan Turks Solidarity Association representative 
in Istanbul, July 8, 2011; phone interview with İzmir BAL-GÖC representative, 21 June, 2011.
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